An airplane of the Piper Cub class is entirely suitable for use in observation of artillery fire
Excerpted from A Treatise on the Fast Airplane versus the Slow-Flying Light Airplane for Observation of Artillery Fire, July 31, 1941, by Dudley B. Howard, Colonel, Air Corps
Problems to be solved
How may a slow-flying airplane having a top speed of about 120 miles per hour operate with reasonable safety and effectiveness in a combat zone which may be infested with enemy pursuit airplanes capable of attacking at speeds of around 300 to 400 miles per hour?
What branch of the Army should operate and maintain the slow-flying type of airplane for observation of artillery fire?
The matter of “reasonable safety” should be discussed. Any job in the combat zone is dangerous. Forward observers at ground observation posts usually are in hazardous positions. Every man at a battery position is in danger of both counterbattery fire and air attack.
There will be plenty good American soldiers willing to take their chances in the slow-flying “puddle-jumpers” and they will be safer than in the use of balloons [captive observation balloons of WWI].
Delivery of airplanes
These airplanes cannot commute back and forth between rear bases and the Front Line. They must be delivered to the artillery positions in some way and there they must stay until crashed, or until it becomes necessary to send them back to a depot for overhaul. The principal reason why they cannot commute is because their slow speed and the necessity for evasive tactics en route do not fit in with scheduled operations from rear bases.
Under favorable conditions, such as when the enemy is not too active in the air in friendly territory, they may be delivered by “hedge-hopping” flight in daytime. According to a magazine article which appeared in the Fall of 1940, (believed to have been by Vincent Sheean in the Saturday Evening Post), a pilot flew a light, slow-flying airplane in daytime from England to Unoccupied France safely immediately following the evacuation of Dunkirk. As the account of the flight is recalled, the pilot crossed the Channel and then turned down the coast flying very low. Whenever he sighted a German airplane or formation, he landed at once, jumped out, and ran for cover, believing that the trip was at an end. Apparently, the Germans did not spot his airplane, because he was never attacked. Each time, he was able to get off again and proceed on his course.
Even if these artillery airplanes cannot be ferried up to the Front in daytime, they can be delivered by truck at night if night landing conditions are too hazardous. The Piper Cub and other airplanes in the same class have detachable or foldable wings, which construction favors transportation by truck, also concealment on the ground. Reconnaissance in the vicinity of the artillery positions will have to be conducted before delivery of airplanes in order to locate suitable landing areas and to improve them, if necessary. This reconnaissance will have to be continuous throughout the action. Members of the airplane crews should be able to attend to this and also to the improvement of selected areas, such as removal of stumps, rocks and bushes, without the aid of Engineer troops. Details of enlisted men from nearby combat troops may be required to assist.



Defensive measures
Passive measures will be considered first. Camouflage painting is of primary importance. A water-soluble paint should be chosen in each color and shade. During movement of the troops, the terrain may vary in color, which will require repainting to insure blending with the ground coloring.
For low-flying aircraft which are, in daytime at least, 3000 yards or more in rear of the Front Line, it is believed that a ground-matching design and coloration should be used on all exterior surfaces. Enemy pursuit which may be trying to spot these airplanes almost invariably will be flying far above the latter. If the under surfaces contrast sharply with the sky, that only makes it easier for our antiaircraft lookouts and gunners to keep our artillery airplanes in view. The advantages of this will appear later.
On the ground, the airplanes should be dispersed as much as possible without too great removal from the artillery positions. There should be no more than one airplane at any landing area, if possible, there should be more landing areas available than airplanes and the latter should be changed about from one area to another to reduce the apparent signs of use, such as wheel tracks.If tree covering is convenient to a landing area, the airplane using this area should be rolled under the trees when not needed for immediate flight. Cut branches, grass, etc., may be required to supplement the tree-covering. Wings should be removed or folded back to reduce the visibility, if necessary, although this treatment will increase the time required for preparation for flight. Conventional nets and garlands should be standard accessory equipment. Supposing that the only cover convenient to the landing area is a lone tree, the airplane fuselage, with wings removed, might be placed tail-up against the tree trunk and lashed to it in this vertical position. The wings could be laid flat on the ground nearby and covered with grass or other available and suitable material. If no cover of any kind is available, the wings might be given the same treatment. Then the fuselage may be covered with a net, or be treated to look like a log, or rock, or apiece of abandoned equipment. The use of a very small airplane should make concealment quite a simple matter for ingenious crew-men.

What may be termed active defensive measures will now be considered. Because each using artillery units will have an antiaircraft defense unit appropriately disposed, the selected landing areas should be within the defended zone. Flights on artillery fire missions or photographic missions should be restricted, if practicable, to the defended zone. The local aircraft warning system should include provisions for signalling the approach of enemy aircraft to the pilot of an artillery airplane which may be in the air. Ground lookouts should have telephone connection with the radio transmitter station which is working with the airplane in order to permit rapid warning of the pilot by radio. As alternative means, prearranged pyrotechnic signals or ground panel signals may be included in the warning system. Provisions should be made for warning of the antiaircraft unit by the airplane pilot in the event that he or his observer detects the approach of enemy fighters before they are observed by ground lookouts. The warning may be signalled to the ground by radio, or by pyrotechnics, by the breaking out of an aircraft-carried colored streamer, or by diving the airplane steeply. The last-mentioned action probably will occur as soon as an enemy airplane is sighted. Therefore, the advantage of having the airplane painted dark underneath so that it will be silhouetted against the sky should now be apparent. The sudden change from level flight to diving altitude should be noted easily. Pilots will have their own evasive maneuvers. Some may do one thing and some another. It may be desirable not to stick to any set practice.
The writer has heard or read about different tactical maneuvers, some of which have actually been employed in real and simulated combat between slow-flyers and fast pursuit airplanes. Some say to dive and then turn laterally out of the path of the attacker. Some prefer to climb and evade, At least, the pilot will have a better opportunity to see what the enemy is doing in the latter method. Some say that altitude must be lost as rapidly as possible to effect a landing within the antiaircraft-defended zone. Others insist strongly that it is better to dive for the tree tops and then to hedgehop until the attack is terminated, rather than to land, because an airplane on the ground is more easily destroyed than one in flight. We can well leave the decision as to the evasive tactics to be employed to the pilot who is in the jam. One of the best ways of insuring safety on flight missions for the artillery is a preventive measure which will be covered in the following paragraph.
Execution of fire control missions
Assuming that an artillery unit is preparing to fire a center-of-impact registration in an area not too close to an enemy target, upon which it is intended to mass heavy surprise fire by transfer from the check-point afforded by the registration. The pilot and observer scheduled for this mission meet with the fire director to prearrange the mission. This may involve the preparation of a gridded photo-map to indicate the precise area in which the registration is to be laid down; also the location of the enemy target.
Distinct features of the terrain close to the areas to be shelled should be selected on the photo for reference purposes to facilitate orientation when in the air. It may be planned to report the center of impact by radio using map coordinates, but the use of radio communication is objectionable because it gives the enemy an opportunity to locate the ground transmitter station by goniometric methods, so it may be more desirable to pin-point the center of impact on the photo-map and then drop the latter near the fire direction center.
All the time that this prearrangement is being effected, the airplane is being prepared for flight and the artillery is getting set to fire. Part of the prearrangement should be that the artillery will fire its registration just as soon as the executive officer sees the airplane in the air. When all is ready, the pilot and observer will hurry to their airplane and take-off without delay. The pilot will climb as fast as possible to the minimum altitude required for accurate observation, which may be 500, 1000 or 1500 feet depending upon the range at which the firing is to be conducted and other considerations.
While climbing, he and the observer will be trying to identify the previously selected reference point and then the firing area. During part of this time the shells will be on the way. In addition to pinpointing the center of impact, it is usually quite easy to pinpoint each burst accurately. When that is done, down they go to drop the photo-map and to hedge-hop until they see a panel signal that the artillery is ready to place fires on the enemy target.
Then the air team climbs rapidly to a position just high enough for accurate observation, no higher. One correction of the fire should be enough for each battery or battalion, as the case may be, to enable fire for effect. Just as soon as the mission is completed, the airplane will be landed or hedge-hopped until another mission is ready, whatever has been planned. Unless there is to be a long delay between missions, time of execution will be speeded up by remaining in the air but close to the surface for safety.
When in the air, the pilot should look for ground areas which most nearly match the camouflage coloring of his airplane and then move into position over such areas, unless he will be beyond his antiaircraft-defended zone. Of course, there may not be time for this, because it will be the practice to restrict most missions to very brief climbs and almost immediate descents, like elevator service.
On surveillance missions, however, the duration of flight may exceed the normal. It is then that the pilot should seek to blend his airplane with the background beneath. Also, he should avoid hovering directly over the artillery position, because he may thereby give away that position to the enemy ground troops. Even when the wind velocity will permit hovering, it would seem to be advisable to change position frequently to make it difficult for enemy antiaircraft units near the front to bring fire of long-range guns to bear on the airplane. On the other hand, any changes in position should be made slowly, because rapid movement may be detected from above despite the camouflage protection.

As the pilot-observer teams become accustomed to working together, and they and their ground-crew men gain experience in foiling enemy detection, they should be able to keep their airplane in constant readiness for flight missions and should “click” with the artillery in the rapid and precise timing of their work. Intelligent teamwork is the answer to the problem in the opinion of the writer.
For the benefit of those who may be skeptical as to the practicability of using slow-flying aircraft in modern warfare between first-class powers, the views of the British Army on this subject will be cited. By this time, the British should know enough about air attack against aircraft in flight and ground objectives to be entitled to respect for their opinions. They warn against “jumping at conclusions” because of what the Germans were able to do to the Allies in France.
Domination of the air by the German Luftwaffe was due to unusual conditions. The Allies were very short on antiaircraft defense equipment and the Germans had such a preponderance of fighter aircraft that they were able to drive the Allied observation airplanes out of the air. That is, the Germans cleared the air of airplanes comparable to our North American O-47B. Airplanes of that type were not fast enough to evade or out-run enemy fighters in their relatively long flights up to the Front from rear bases.
It is possible that slow-flyers, able to land almost anywhere at the Front and to make brief, minimum altitude observation flights, might have had a better chance to survive. The old paradox seems to apply in this instance. The French airplanes apparently were too slow and likewise too fast. According to one Military Attache report from London, “No British officer with experience in France knew of anything but a rare exceptional case where German fighters attempted an attack below 2000 feet inside British lines. (Apparently, the British were better equipped with antiaircraft weapons than the French). If with supremacy Germans enjoyed in France their fighters were unwilling to place themselves at a tactical disadvantage, it is safe to assume that low flying airplanes inside our lines will not be bothered often.” Quoting further from the same report: “Many officers expressed the opinion that everyone has been inclined to overstress the Battle of France, that such a one-sided air show will be rare between 1st class powers in future.”
Concerning the comparative safety of slow-flyers from enemy another Military Attache report from London says: “The airplane will turn inside an attacking fighter and can land before the second pass. Experiments conducted at school (The British Field ArtillerySchool) showed that in a known 50 miles square area fighters flying at 8,900 feet had less than a 5 percent chance of finding these planes at around 1500 feet.” Referring to the out-maneuvering of a fighter, simulated attack of a Stinson O-49 by Curtiss P-40s [Warhawk] was conducted at Fort Sill. A formation of three P-40s equipped with gun-cameras, dove on a lone O-49 and took motion pictures which showed that the O-49 was able to turn out of the path of the leading fighter, but could not evade the flank airplanes of the formation. However, it is considered to be highly improbable that an enemy will risk more than one fighter to attack an artillery airplane; also improbable that he will descend to machine gun range of an airplane flying at 500 to 1500 feet altitude over a zone defended by antiaircraft weapons.
Operation and maintenance of slow-flying artillery airplanes
The field artillery is constantly in need of air observation as a rule. That means every battalion, for every battalion is in firing position except when displacing. Even displacement is often executed by echelon within the battalion, so that air observation is required for echelons in firing position. The artillery holds out no reserves. Ammunition may be considered to be the only reserve.
How can each battalion have constant air observation service employing slow-flying aircraft? Certainly not by commuting air teams. They must be resident teams. The Air Corps has adopted the principle of relatively permanent assignment of personnel to combat teams, or crews. Nowadays, all operational forces which are composed of various ground elements, such as infantry, field artillery, etc., and aviation elements, are constantly striving for perfect coordination between the component elements. Whenever, field artillery can furnish effective support of its large caliber weapons for the infantry, it does so. When the artillery cannot furnish the required supporting fires for some reason, then combat aviation may be in a position to support the infantry.
However, the infantry has found it necessary to include in its organic equipment certain heavy weapons which are immediately available for close support. The system of communications is so closely-knit that coordination is effective, and, when the fire power of the infantry heavy weapons is adequate against a particular target, it can be brought to bear on that target more quickly than artillery support can be obtained through the more extended communications net. The heavy weapons with which our infantry is now equipped include 60-mm and 81-mm mortars and 37-mm cannon. The German Army has gone even further and has equipped each infantry regiment with six 75-mm howitzers and two 150-m guns, These cannon are part of the organic equipment of the infantry and are manned by infantrymen.
Applying the foregoing facts by way of analogy to the artillery air observation of fire situation, it seems logical that slow-flying aircraft, which are ideally suited to afford constant observation service if immediately available should be allotted to appropriate artillery units as items of their organic equipment and also that these aircraft should be manned entirely by artillerymen. The degree of coordination between firing unit and observation aviation is of more micrometric precision than that required in the support of infantry rifle companies by heavy weapons units.
Furthermore, the communications system connecting Front Line troops with rear-based Air Corps observation squadrons is far more extended and slow-acting than the system connecting infantry assault troops with supporting artillery units. It seems to be a reasonable conclusion that the Field Artillery should own and operate its own slow-flying aircraft. And, such an arrangement should not in any way deprive the artillery of the right to call for observation of fire by fast Air Corps airplanes whenever the air situation prohibits the use of slow-flyers, or when the artillery requires penetration of enemy territory for observation of long-range fire and for photographic missions.
It has been suggested to the writer that the allotment of the proposed airplanes to the Field Artillery should be completely decentralized, even to the extent of alloting one airplane to each battalion, to be maintained and operated by personnel permanently assigned to the battalion, in the same manner that antitank guns or machine guns for the protection of batteries in position are allotted and handled. Very close teamwork and high esprit de corps within the battalion should be promoted by that arrangement, but it may be desirable to have the greater flexibility of control which should result from allotment of the total number of airplanes required by the artillery component of a division or corps to the headquarters battery of the artillery component for temporary assignment to artillery fire missions by the Artillery Commander, or a designated staff officer.
Economical considerations
Airplanes of the Stinson O-49 class, although capable of slow flight and therefore adapted for the use of small landing areas just like the commercial training types such as the Piper Cub, Taylor Cub, etc., are in reality quite substantial airplanes. This means that materials, the procurement of which is an important defense problem. For comparison in this respect, the weights (empty) of three standard observation airplanes are cited below:
North American O-47B
Curtiss O-52
Stinson O-49
Now, compare the empty weight of a Piper Cub:
6218 lbs.
3960 lbs.
2583 lbs.
600 lbs.
The Cub is only one-fourth the weight of the Stinson O-49 and contains in its construction only 75 lbs. of aluminum fittings and motor parts. The principal structural members are made of molybdenum-steel. It should be obvious that selection of a commercial trainer of the Piper Cub class should reduce the load on defense production facilities as a whole very materially.
Now, it may be interesting to compare the cost of the aircraft under consideration:
Stinson O-49 (probably without radio)
Piper Cub (including two-way radio)
$15,642.97
2,000.00
The personnel problem
If the Air Corps continues to operate and maintain all aircraft which serve the Field Artillery and other branches of the Army, it is practically certain that no tiny airplanes of the commercial training type will be procured. Airplane pilots who have been trained in the Air Corps schools would suffer a great loss of morale if detailed to pilot such aircraft, because it would mean going with the artillery for extended periods of time, not just intermittent artillery missions. In the interest of teamwork and development of proficient technique, it is believed that pilots selected for the artillery work should be detailed with the Field Artillery, if the Air Corps is to continue in the performance of all flying for the Army.
It is believed that, in addition to lowering morale, the use of fully qualified Military Airplane Pilots for the operation of “flivver” airplanes would be wasting their ability. On the other hand Field Artillery personnel qualified as “Private Pilot” or “Commercial Pilot” under the Civil Aeronautics Authority, or civilians having such qualifications probably would be eager to perform the proposed kind of flying duty. They could be given a relatively lower rating such as “Light Airplane Pilot” and would be proud of it.
In seeking the answer to the pilot problem, assuming that slow-flyers are adopted for artillery observation, the writer again is led toward the apparent practical necessity for delegating the operation of this special type of aircraft to the field artillery in toto. The procurement of pilots and maintenance mechanics should be a very simple problem. Throughout the Field Artillery there are many officers and probably enlisted men, who are pilots qualified under the Civil Aeronautics Authority to operate airplanes of the training and higher types. In one Battery Officers class at the Field Artillery School, when the question was asked as to whether there were any students with pilot licenses, eight officers held up their hands. With these pilots qualified, available, and probably quite willing to operate artillery airplanes of the commercial training type, if given the opportunity, the Field Artillery should have a nucleus with which to commence operations and to train more officers.
Of course, there is an enormous pool of commercial pilots in civil life from which pilots for the Field Artillery may be obtained. Considering the enthusiasm with which these civilians would jump at the opportunity to qualify for commissioned or non-commissioned officer appointments appropriate to their educational qualifications in the Field Artillery. Because an airplane of the Piper Cub class can take-off in a shorter distance and climb faster if flown solo, it may become desirable to use the pilot as the observer on many missions. For that reason, it is believed that it would be desirable to have officer pilots, who are graduates of the Field Artillery School.
The maintenance mechanics will require limited training if a simple airplane like the Piper Cub is adopted. Information has been received that the thirteen commercial trainers used in maneuvers near Fort Bliss were maintained by one mechanic only. The most serious damage sustained by any one of those airplanes was washed-out landing gear, which required only a few minutes for complete replacement by spare gear costing about $25.00 each, Accidents of that kind occurred sometimes when landing on curved roadways. There was no injury to personnel even in those instances.

A demonstration
By authority of the Commandant, The Field Artillery School, demonstrations in the camouflaging and concealment of a Piper Cub airplane were conducted at Fort Sill on July 29, 1941. The Piper Aircraft Company had directed its pilot, Mr. J. Maurice Helbert, to drop in at this station to offer his services in any demonstrations which the Commandant might desire.
The pilot bought some calcimine paint and coated the tail, nose and upper surface of the wings of his airplane in as effective a camouflage pattern as could be expected under the circumstances. The selected colors were somewhat too light and vivid in color for the local foliage coloring, but the job had to be done in a hurry. At about 12:30 P.M., the airplane was landed at the southwestern edge of Post Field and pulled tail-first into weeds with the tail down in a ravine under a small tree. The wings were exposed. Some weeds were placed over the glossy windshield and the motor, but no further effort was made to cover the exposed parts with weeds or foliage. If more time had been available, it is believed that the airplane could have been better concealed. However, it was the intention to determine what the camouflage painting could do for exposed parts. (Incidentally, the pilot landed directly down-wind in tall grass with a run of only an estimated 200 feet. The take-off was down-wind and about the same run was required. The surface wind velocity at that time was 8 m.p.h.) A photographic airplane spotted the Piper Cub very readily from 5000 feet altitude, but the observer knew about where to look. A written report of the observer, Major O.B. Combs, Field Artillery, will be submitted as an attachment. Ordinary black and white photos were taken at 5000 and 2000 feet altitude. Just previous to the attempted concealment ordinary and colored (kodachrome) pictures were taken of the little airplane from an altitude of 1000 feet while parked in the open on Post Field.
Later, the airplane was landed on the dirt road at the western edge of Musketry Flats and pulled under a small clump of trees by the pilot, unassisted. When the writer arrived by automobile, the airplane was well-concealed without the aid of cut foliage. The observer in the photographic airplane stated that he could not have found the little airplane if he had not seen it land near the trees. Photos were taken as before. Then, the airplane was taken-off and flow at 5000 feet altitude over the Beef Creek and Cache Creek area, while the photographic airplane took pictures at 5000 feet and 2000 feet (kodachrome) accompanied by visual observation, which will be mentioned in detail in the observers report. (Incidentally, the Piper Cub took-off cross-wind, now 14 m.p.h., along the rutted road in an uphill run of about 150 feet, a remarkable performance.)
Conclusions
- That, in addition to the fast-plane service which may be required of the Air Corps by the Field Artillery under some circumstances, the use of slow-flying, light airplanes capable of operating out of extremely small clear areas and roads in the immediate vicinity of artillery firing positions under normal conditions is mandatory.
- That the special artillery airplane which may be selected will have to live at the artillery positions for use of resident air observation teams. Observation service must be immediately available every moment.
- A commercial primary-training type of airplane similar to the Piper Cub is the answer to the problem of selection of an artillery airplane for Front Line use.
- That a slow-flying airplane of the commercial trainer type can be operated from landing areas closely adjacent to the artillery positions in modern warfare between first-class powers with reasonable safety and reliability.
- That the responsibility for the operation and the lower echelons of maintenance should be delegated to the Field Artillery. The Air Corps should stand in the position of the Quartermaster Corps in the matter of procurement, supply and higher echelons of maintenance of equipment to line branches. The personnel procurement and training incident to operation and maintenance also should be included in the responsibilities of the Field Artillery.
